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This paper studies non-committed procurement in which (i) it is not
economically viable for a buyer (e.g. government) to commit herself to
scoring rules due to the complex nature of the good and (ii) asymmetric
sellers have aliated signals on production costs with interdependent val-
ues. In non-committed procurement, a buyer advertises open invitations to
potential sellers without committing to scoring rules, sellers submit menus
of alternative contracts, and nally the buyer selects a winning seller by
choosing a contract from the winning seller's menu. This paper establishes
the existence of a continuum of monotone equilibria given the multiplicity
of continuation equilibrium that the buyer would choose to follow for her
contract choice from the winning seller's menu. Monotone equilibrium is
bounded above by joint ex-post eciency and below by joint interim e-
ciency. Among multiple equilibria, the jointly ex-post ecient equilibrium
is not only jointly ex-post renegotiation-proof but also ex-ante robust to
the possibility that the buyer might choose to follow any alternative contin-
uation equilibrium upon any seller's deviation. The results also suggest the
practical importance of the buyer's reputation for a jointly ex-post ecient
contract choice under interdependence values without her commitment.
1 Introduction
Procurement of goods or services is an important part of the economy. For ex-
ample, public procurement by governments accounts for 10 to 15% of GDP in
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1developed countries and up to 20% of GPD in developing countries. The items
acquired through procurement vary from simple stationary items to highly com-
plex goods and services such as infrastructure projects, nuclear power plants,
and military weapons. Recently, US infrastructure projects nanced under the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act have been awarded to numerous pri-
vate construction companies in order to stimulate the US economy.1 In 2009,
the United Arab Emirates awarded $25 billion construction and nuclear power
projects to a team led by Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO). In 2010,
Canada announced a $9 billion plan to purchase sixty ve F-35 joint strike ghter
jets from Lockheed Martin.
In order to model procurement, various scoring auctions where a buyer (e.g.,
government) can commit to a scoring rule are proposed in the literature. In scor-
ing auctions, each seller submits a single bid (or equivalently a single contract),
i.e., a pair of characteristics of the good and an amount of monetary payment
that the buyer pays to the seller. The scoring rule calculates each seller's score
given his bid and the seller with highest score wins procurement.2 Examples
of scoring auctions include the rst scoring auction, the second scoring auction,
and the handicap auction.3 Che (1993) and Asker and Cantillon (2008) study
scoring auctions in situations where sellers' signals on production costs have only
private values. Branco (1997) considers scoring auctions with symmetric sellers,
independent signals and common values.
While scoring auctions generate competitive bidding in an intuitive way, scor-
ing rules must specify scores for all possible bids that sellers may submit. This
may be quite complex, especially when characteristics of the good are highly
multidimensional. For example, when a government is considering awarding a
contract for the construction of a tunnel in a mountainous area, the specication
of the tunnel to be built would be highly multidimensional. The characteristics
may include the possible route, length, and radius of the tunnel, the construc-
tion method to be utilized, the air ventilation system, the construction time,
and the operating issues after the construction: the list of the specications goes
on and on. In this case, it may not be economically viable for the government
to commit itself to a scoring rule that species a score for every possible bid.
The diculty of procurement of tunnel construction is compounded because the
construction cost may not be fully known to the construction companies. The
1The US government is by far the biggest buyer in the world. Every 20 seconds of each
working day, the federal government awards a contract with an average value of $465,000.
2We use feminine pronouns for the buyer and masculine pronouns for sellers.
3Given the scoring rule in each auction, the seller with the highest score wins procurement.
In the rst scoring auction, the winning seller executes the contract he submits. In the second
scoring auction, the winning seller can execute any contract that matches the highest rejected
score. The handicap auction can give dierent additional scores to dierent sellers on top of
scores based on the contracts that they submit.
2construction cost will depend on the geological characteristics of the mountain,
the composition and distribution of minerals in the area in which the tunnel is
to be constructed. Dierent construction companies may receive dierent sig-
nals on construction costs. Those signals have interdependent values in the sense
that each company's estimate of its construction cost depends on all companies'
signals and its estimate would be more precise if other companies' signals were
known to the company.
With no ex-ante commitment to a scoring rule, a government may, in practice,
simply advertise open invitations for the procurement of a highly complex good or
service with a few descriptive objectives. Sellers can then submit and present their
proposals, which often include multiple possible bids, i.e., pairs of characteristics
of the good and monetary payment. It may take the government a few months or
years to evaluate the proposals and start negotiating with the winning seller on
the characteristics of the good to be provided and the corresponding monetary
payment.4 When sellers' signals have interdependent values, each seller's decision
on the initial proposal may depend on his belief on how much the government's
perception of production costs which it developed from viewing other sellers'
proposals spills over to its negotiation with the winning seller.
This paper studies the existence of monotone equilibria and the eciency
properties of equilibrium allocations in non-committed procurement when (i) it
is not economically viable for a buyer (e.g. government) to commit herself to
scoring rules due to the complex nature of the good and (ii) asymmetric sellers
privately receive aliated signals on production costs with interdependent values.
Abstracting from reality, this paper formulates non-committed procurement in
which the buyer advertises open invitations, sellers submit menus of alternative
contracts (pairs of characteristics of the good and monetary payment), and the
buyer evaluates menus by identifying the best contract in them and awards the
procurement to the winning seller by choosing the best contract from the winning
seller's menu.
Given a seller's signal and the maximum payo that he is willing to give to
the buyer, the ex-post joint surplus between the seller and the buyer depends on
both the seller's signal and competing sellers' signals under interdependent values.
When a seller believes that competing sellers reveal their signals by oering menus
of alternative contracts contingent on their signals, he also has incentives to oer
a menu of alternative contracts contingent on his own signal in a way that his
menu includes each alternative contract that maximizes the ex-post joint surplus
for each possible array of all sellers' signals given the maximum payo that he is
willing to give to the buyer. The buyer may well then choose the contract that
4Public procurement follows the principle set of rules (e.g., Federal Acquisition Regulation
in the U.S.) and the government often has an oversight agency (e.g., Oce of the Procurement
Ombudsman in Canada).
3maximizes the seller's ex-post payo from the menu given her belief on all sellers'
signals as long as it gives her the highest payo among all alternative contracts
in the menu. Such a choice made by the buyer maximizes the seller's ex-post
payo given the maximum payo that he is willing to give to the buyer.5
At the same time, such a menu leaves multiple optimal alternatives available
to the buyer because the buyer's payo depends only on the characteristics of
the good and the monetary payment to be provided but not on the production
cost signals. Therefore, it is also possible for the buyer to choose an arbitrary
optimal contract from the winning seller's menu regardless of her belief on all
sellers' signals that she acquires from their menu oers. In this case, the contract
that the buyer chooses from the seller's menu must maximize the interim joint
surplus conditional on winning the procurement given only the seller's own signal
because it is always feasible for the seller to oer a degenerate menu consisting
of a single contract.
A seller's equilibrium menu oer therefore depends on his belief on how likely
the buyer would choose a contract that would maximize the ex-post joint surplus
when it is equally optimal with some of other alternative contracts in the menu.
This paper studies a truthful monotone equilibrium in which a seller reveals his
signal by making his equilibrium menu oer contingent on his signal. Let i
denote the probability that the buyer chooses a contract that maximizes the ex-
post joint surplus in a continuation equilibrium when it is optimal in seller i's
menu. In turn, 1   i denotes the probability that the buyer chooses the same
contract in seller i's menu, regardless of her belief on the other sellers' signals,
which must be jointly interim ecient in a continuation equilibrium. A vector
 = [1;:::;N] 2 [0;1]N then denotes sellers' beliefs on how likely the buyer
chooses a contract that maximizes the ex-post joint surplus across sellers' menus.
This paper establishes a continuum of truthful monotone equilibria that spans
the entire space of sellers' beliefs [0;1]N. Following Reny's existence result (2011),
one could establish the existence of a truthful monotone equilibrium if each seller's
interim payo function were weakly quasisupermodular and weakly single cross-
ing given the other sellers' non-decreasing strategies. However, a seller's interim
payo functions may fail to be weakly quasisupermodular or weakly single cross-
ing at irrational bids or rational bids with a positive probability of ties just as
Athey's single crossing condition may fail in rst price auctions with single di-
mensional bids (Reny and Zamir 2004).6 This paper extends Reny and Zamir's
5Joint ex-post eciency is not reached in equilibrium under interdependent values if each
seller is allowed to submit only a single contract.
6Reny and Zamir (2004) show that IRT-SCC is sucient to show the existence of a monotone
equilibrium in rst price auctions with single dimensional bids in the general case involving
asymmetric bidders, interdependent values, and aliated signals. The existence of equilibrium
in rst price auctions can also be found in Athey (2001), Bresky (1999), Jackson and Swinkels
(2003), Lebrun (1999), Maskin and Riley (2000). Those works restrict attention to either two
4\individually rational tieless single crossing condition" (IRT-SCC) and introduces
the \tieless supermodular condition" (TLS-SMC). This paper shows that IRT-
SCC and TLS-SMC ensure both the weakly single crossing condition and the
weakly quasisupermodular condition at individually rational tieless bids, which
are sucient to establish the existence of a truthful monotone equilibrium at any
given  = [1;:::;N]. Subsequently the existence of a truthful monotone equi-
librium is established at any given  = [1;:::;N] by showing that IRT-SCC
and TLS-SMC are satised in our model.
The continuum of truthful monotone equilibria is bounded above by the joint
ex-post eciency level and below by the level of joint interim eciency. Given
the continuum of truthful monotone equilibria, we examine which equilibrium
is stable under two criteria. First of all, we adopt the notion of jointly ex-
post renegotiation-proof equilibrium in which it is not mutually benecial for the
buyer and the winning seller to renegotiate their contract given a signal vector.
If equilibrium is not jointly ex-post ecient, there is a positive probability that a
mutually benecial renegotiation between the buyer and the winning seller exists.
While there is a continuum of equilibria, the jointly ex-post ecient equilibrium
is the only one that is jointly ex-post renegotiation-proof.
Joint ex-post renegotiation is a notion that can be used to examine whether
the buyer and the winning seller can improve upon the contract after the win-
ning seller is chosen. Sellers may consider deviations from their menu oers
(i.e., change their menus) even before the buyer chooses a winning seller. Given
the multiplicity of continuation equilibrium that the buyer chooses to follow for
her contract choice, sellers' incentives for deviations depend on the continuation
equilibrium that they believe the buyer would choose upon their deviations. For
example, consider a truthful monotone equilibrium based on a continuation equi-
librium in which the buyer always chooses a jointly interim ecient contract from
seller 1's menu upon accepting it, but always chooses a jointly ex-post ecient
contract from the other sellers' menus. If seller 1 believed that the buyer would in
fact follow the continuation equilibrium where she always chooses a jointly ex-post
ecient contract from his menu following his deviation, then seller 1 could deviate
to a more aggressive menu, which provides a higher payo to the buyer than his
original menu does, in order to win procurement with a higher probability. Not
only does such a deviation show that equilibrium menu oers (and consequently
equilibrium contracts) in some equilibrium are not ex-ante robust to the possi-
bility that the buyer would follow an alternative continuation equilibrium, but it
also indicates that some equilibrium may not provide stable predictions on how
likely each seller would win procurement, because seller 1's deviation to a more
aggressive menu makes it more likely for seller 1 to win and less likely for other
sellers to win. In this light, we can examine how ex-ante robust an equilibrium is
bidders, symmetric bidders, independent signals, and private or common values.
5to (sellers' beliefs on) the continuation equilibrium. We show that if the truthful
monotone equilibrium is based on a continuation equilibrium in which the buyer
chooses a jointly ex-post ecient contract from the winning seller's menu with
positive probability, then it is ex-ante robust to a set of continuation equilibria in
which the buyer chooses a jointly ex-post ecient contract with a lower proba-
bility. Therefore, if the truthful monotone equilibrium is based on a continuation
equilibrium in which the buyer chooses a jointly ex-post ecient contract with
probability one, then it is ex-ante robust to all continuation equilibria: no sellers
have incentives to deviate regardless of the continuation equilibrium that they
believe the buyer would choose to follow for her contract choice following their
deviations.
The jointly ex-post ecient equilibrium is appealing because it is both jointly
ex-post renegotiation proof and ex-ante robust to all continuation equilibria.
With a lack of commitment on the buyer's side, it would be practically important
for the buyer to build up a reputation for adhering to the jointly ex-post ecient
equilibrium. In practice, the buyer would acquire sellers' information on produc-
tion costs by reviewing and evaluating their proposals. It implies that the buyer
plays the role of the collector of information on production costs by reviewing
and evaluating sellers' proposals. Therefore, the buyer would have additional
information on production costs that the winning seller does not have when she
negotiates with him. If the buyer can establish her reputation in practice in a
way that it leads sellers to believe her additional information on production costs
would be used in negotiating a contract with the winning seller, sellers would
submit their menus of contracts accordingly, and leading to the jointly ex-post
ecient equilibrium.
2 Preliminaries
The buyer contracts with one of N sellers on the characteristics of the good
to be provided and on the monetary payment to be given the seller. Let N =
f1;:::;Ng be the set of sellers. Let t 2 R denote an amount of monetary payment
from the buyer to a seller. Let x 2 X denote the characteristics of the good. For
any x; x0 in X, let x_x0 denote the least upper bound (join) of x and x0; and x^x0
denote the greatest lower bound (meet) of x and x0. If X  R
n, then the join of
x and x0 is the component-wise maximum and the meet is the component-wise
minimum. A set X is a lattice if for any x and x0 in X, the joint and meet of x
and x0 exist as elements of X.
Assumption 1. X is a compact metric space and a partially ordered lattice with
a transitive, reexive and antisymmetric order relation .7
7An order relation is reexive if x  x for all x 2 X and antisymmetric if x  x0 and x0  x
6Each seller i receives a private signal si 2 [0;1] on the production costs of the
good. Throughout the paper, the upper case letter Si will denote seller i's signal
as a random variable and the lower case letter si will denote its realization. The
joint density of sellers' signals is denoted by f : [0;1]N ! R+: When the buyer and
seller i agree to execute a contract (x;t) given a vector of signals s = [s1;:::;sN],
seller i's payo function is t   ci(x;s); the buyer's payo function is u(x)   t;
and the remaining sellers receive their reservation payos. If the buyer does not
contract with any seller, the buyer and all sellers receive their reservation payos.
All reservation payos are normalized to zero. Note that the payo of the seller
who contracts with the buyer depends on the other sellers' signals, so signals have
interdependent values.
We will maintain the following assumptions on the buyer's and sellers' payo
functions, and on the joint density function f of sellers' signals.
Assumption 2 (i) ci(x;s) is bounded, measurable, and continuous in x at each
s.
(ii) u(x) is bounded, measurable and continuous.
(iv) ci(x;s) is strictly decreasing in si and non-increasing in s i at each x.
(v) For x and x0 in X at each s,
u(x ^ x
0)   ci(x ^ x
0;s) + u(x _ x




0;s) + u(x)   ci(x;s):
(vi) For any x0  x; ci(x0;s)   ci(x;s) is non-increasing in s.
Ri(x;s) = u(x)   ci(x;s) is the joint ex-post surplus between seller i and the
buyer when seller i sells the good with characteristics x to the buyer, given a
signal vector s. Assumption 2.(v) implies that the joint ex-post surplus function
is supermodular in x at each s. Assumption 2.(vi) implies that ci(x;s) is single
crossing in s, and it follows that the ex-post surplus function R(x;s) is also single
crossing in s:
Assumption 3 (i) f(s) is measurable and strictly positive on [0;1]N.
(ii) f(s _ s0)f(s ^ s0)  f(s)f(s0) for all s;s0 2 [0;1]N.
Assumption 3.(i) implies that, given any si; the support of i's conditional
distribution on the other signals is [0;1]: Assumption 2.(ii) implies that signals
are aliated.
For each s, let
X

i (s)  argmax
x2X
Ri(x;s)
implies that x = x0:
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t = u(x1*(s1,s2)) -u1 
 t’ = u(x1*(s1,s2’)) -u1 
t 
x 
Figure 1: Preferences under interdependent values
be the set of jointly ex-post ecient characteristics of the good. X
i (s) is non-
empty because Ri(x;s) is continuous in x at each s; and X is compact. Let x
i(s)
denote a typical element in X
i (s). The following explains how a seller's pref-
erences over contracts depend upon the vector of signals. Consider an example
with two sellers and a one dimensional X as in gure 1. Suppose that seller 1
with signal s1 is willing to give the buyer a payo level u1: In gure 1, the lower
curve is the buyer's indierence curve associated with the utility level u1 and the
two curves above it represents the iso-prot curves for seller 1 with the signal s1,
one with seller 2's signal s2 and the other with seller 2's signal s0
2.
Note that the buyer's payo does not depend on the vector of production
cost signals. While the buyer is indierent between any contracts along her
indierence curve, seller 1's payo depends on both his signal and seller 2's signal.
If seller 1 knew that seller 2's signal was s2, seller 1, with the signal s1; would
prefer the jointly ex-post ecient contract (x
1(s1;s2);u(x
1(s1;s2)) u1) given the
payo level u1 that he is willing to give to the buyer. If he knew that seller 2's
signal was s0





2)) u1): Because the seller's preferences over those
contracts along the buyer's indierence curve depend on the vector of signals,
8it may create incentives for a seller to oer a menu of contracts to the buyer
in which multiple jointly ex-post ecient contracts are optimal for the buyer,
making it possible for the buyer to choose the one most preferred by the seller
given the buyer's correct perception on the vector of signals in equilibrium. As
will be explained later, with an absence of the buyer's commitment on what to
choose, a menu with multiple optimal contracts for the buyer also leaves multiple
continuation equilibria.
3 Non-Committed Procurement
In non-committed procurement, the buyer advertises an open invitation for po-
tential sellers because she cannot commit herself to a scoring rule. Sellers then
simultaneously submit menus of contracts. After reviewing and evaluating all
menus submitted by sellers, the buyer accepts one or none of menus. If she ac-
cepts a menu, she then chooses a contract (x;t) from the menu. Those sellers
whose menus are not accepted receive zero payos. Formally, a menu mi that
seller i submits is a closed subset of XR. Let Mi be the set of all feasible menus
available to each seller i:
By reviewing and evaluating menu mi; the buyer learns the maximum payo
that she can achieve from accepting mi. For any menu mi, dene





The payo from choosing any contract in D(mi) is the maximum payo that the
buyer can achieve once she accepts mi: Given m = [m1;:::;mN]; let i(m) 2
(mi) be the probability distribution over the contracts in the menu mi that the
buyer choose a contract (x;t) from. The buyer's strategy for contract choices
 = [1;:::;N] is a continuation equilibrium if the support of i(m) is a subset
of D(mi) for all m and all i.8 Let C be the set of all continuation equilibria.






upon the buyer's acceptance of mi.
The buyer's menu acceptance behavior in non-committed procurement is as
follows. She accepts the menu that gives her the highest payo among all sub-
mitted menus if the highest payo is non-negative. If there are two or more such
8A continuation equilibrium consists of (i) the buyer's contracting decision strategies  =
[1;:::;N] and (ii) her belief on sellers' signals contingent on their menu oers, which is
formed according to Bayes' rule whenever possible. A continuation equilibrium is referred as
only the buyer's contracting decision strategies unless specied because it is straightforward to
assign an admissible belief for a truthful monotone equilibrium dened in Denition 1.
9menus, she accepts either of them with equal probability. Let mj : [0;1] ! Mj
denote seller j's menu strategy. Let uj(sj) denote the maximum payo that the
buyer can achieve by accepting mj(sj). That is, uj(sj) is the payo that the
buyer can achieve by choosing a contracting decision in D(mj(sj)): Let ui be the
maximum payo that the buyer can achieve by accepting seller i's menu mi. Let
ki(ui;u i(s i)) be the number of sellers such that
ki(ui;u i(s i)) = #fj : uj(sj) = ui = max
n un(sn)  0g:
Let i(ui;u i(s i)) denote the probability that seller i wins the procurement
when he oers a menu mi that induces a maximum payo ui to the buyer, given
the other sellers' menu oers m i(s i):
i(ui;u i(s i)) =

1=ki(ui;u i(s i)) if ki(ui;u i(s i))  1;
0 otherwise. :
When the other sellers employ menu strategies m i; seller i's interim payo as-
sociated with his signal si and his menu oer mi is
Vi(mi;m ijsi;i) = E[vi(mi;m i(S i);S;i)i(ui;u i(s i))jsi]:
Denition 1 fm;g is a truthful monotone (pure-strategy) equilibrium if
1. for all i 2 N; all mi 2 Mi; and a.e. si 2 [0;1], mi satises
Vi(mi(si);m ijsi;i)  Vi(mi;m ijsi;i);
given a continuation equilibrium  2 C.
2. for all i 2 N, mi(si) 6= mi(s0
i) if si 6= s0
i and
3. for all i 2 N; ui(s0
i)  ui(si) if s0
i  si.
Denition 1.1 is self-explanatory in that mi(si) is the best reply for seller i with
signal si given the other sellers' strategies and the continuation equilibrium that
the buyer chooses to follow for her choice of a contract upon accepting a menu.
Denition 1.2 implies the truthfulness of each seller's menu strategy in the sense
that the buyer can correctly infer each seller's signal from his menu oer. A
menu is suciently general for a seller to reveal his signal on production costs.
For example, even when seller i is willing to give the same level of payo ui to
the buyer under two dierent signals, he can construct two dierent menus mi
and m0
i that can induce the same maximum payo ui:9 Denition 1.3 implies
9Although mi and m0
i induce the same maximum payo ui for the buyer, the sets of optimal
contracts for the buyer can be dierent (D(mi) 6= D(m0
i)) so that mi 6= m0
i: Alternatively, mi
and m0
i may have the same set of optimal contracts for the buyer (D(mi) = D(m0
i)) but they
can have dierent contracts that yield payos lower than ui so that mi 6= m0
i:
10the monotonicity of each seller's menu strategy in the sense that if his signal is
higher, a seller oers a menu that yields a higher payo to the buyer.
The potential diculty in analyzing the equilibrium is the multiplicity of con-
tinuation equilibrium that will arise when a menu leaves multiple optimal con-
tracts available to the buyer. Not only should a seller consider competing sellers'
menu strategies, but he should also form a correct belief over the continuation
equilibrium that the buyer would choose to follow from among the multiple con-
tinuation equilibria. Given the other sellers' non-decreasing strategies, let A(ui)
be the event that the maximum payo that the other sellers' menus can give to









where uj(sj) is the maximum payo that the buyer can achieve by accepting the
menu mj(sj).
If Pr(A(ui))jsi) = 0; then E[(R(x;S)   ui)i(ui;u i(S i))jA(ui);si] = 0 be-
cause i(ui;u i(s i)) = 0 for all s i; given si and ui: When seller i's menu mi
induces a maximum payo ui to the buyer and she chooses the contract (x;t)
with t = u(x)   ui; upon accepting mi, seller i's interim payo is
E[(t   ci(x;S))i(ui;u i(S i))jsi] =
E[(u(x) + ci(x;S)   ui)i(ui;u i(S i))jsi] =
Pr(A(ui))jsi)E[(R(x;S)   ui)i(ui;u i(S i))jA(ui);si]:
Consider the jointly interim ecient and the jointly ex-post ecient char-
acteristics of the good when seller i sells the good to the buyer given the other
sellers' non-decreasing strategies. When ui is the maximum payo that the buyer
can achieve from a menu mi oered by seller i with signal si; and she chooses (x;t)
with t = u(x)   ui from mi, the joint interim surplus conditional on (A(ui);si)
becomes E[Ri(x;S)i(ui;u i(S i))jA(ui);si]: Given (A(ui);si;u i), let
X
e
i (A(ui);si;u i) = argmax
x2X
E[Ri(x;S)i(ui;u i(S i))jA(ui);si] (2)
be the set of jointly interim ecient characteristics of the good.
Because Ri(x;s) is continuous in x at each s and i(ui;u i(s i)) is a real
number in [0;1]; Ri(x;s)i(ui;u i(s i)) is continuous in x at each s: It implies
that E[Ri(x;S)i(ui;u i(S i))jA(ui);si] is continuous in x: Because X is compact
and E[Ri(x;S)i(ui;u i(S i))jA(ui);si] is continuous in x, Xe
i (A(ui);si;u i) is
non-empty by Weierstrass' Theorem. Let xe
i(ui;si;u i) denote a typical element
in Xe
i (A(ui);si;u i): If E[(R(x;S)  ui)i(ui;u i(S i))jA(ui);si] = 0 for all x 2
X, then let Xe
i (ui;si;u i) = fxg; where x 2 X denotes the status-quo action
11such as no trading, that makes Ri(x;s) = vi(x;s) + u(x) = 0 for all s 2 [0;1].
Let x  x for all x 2 X.
Suppose that the buyer will always choose the same contract from a seller's
menu regardless of her perception on all sellers' production cost signals after she
evaluates all menus. In equilibrium, the same contract that the buyer chooses
must be a jointly interim ecient contract because it is always feasible for a
seller to submit a degenerate menu consisting of a single contract. Therefore, the
equilibrium is only jointly interim ecient even though sellers' signals are fully
revealed to the buyer in equilibrium.
Contrarily, suppose that the buyer will always choose a jointly ex-post ecient
contract from a seller's menu when it is available in the menu and optimal to the
buyer. Consider the jointly ex-post ecient contract (x
i(s);u(x
i(s))   ui(si))
associated with the maximum payo ui(si) that seller i is willing to give to the
buyer at each si , where s = (si;s i): Given si and ui(si), seller i may include
every jointly ex-post ecient contract (x
i(s);u(x
i(s))   ui(si)) for every s i:
Because the buyer is fully aware of sellers' production cost signals after evaluating
their menus in a truthful monotone equilibrium, she can choose the jointly ex-
post ecient contract (x
i(s);u(x
i(s)) ui(si)) from seller i's menu at every s as
long as ui(si) is the maximum payo that she can achieve from accepting seller
i's menu. When all sellers believe that the buyer would always choose such a
jointly ex-post ecient contract, they will submit their menus accordingly and
the equilibrium is jointly ex-post ecient.10
When a menu includes multiple optimal contracts for the buyer, it leads to
multiple continuation equilibria. If it was optimal, the buyer could always choose
a jointly ex-post ecient contract from a menu. Alternatively, the buyer may
choose the same optimal contract regardless of her perception on sellers' signals.
In this case, the contract that the buyer chooses must be jointly interim ecient
because a seller can always oer a degenerate menu consisting of a single con-
tract. Finally, the buyer may even randomize her choice between a jointly ex-post
ecient contract and a jointly interim ecient one in a menu.
4 Truthful Monotone Equilibria
Because the buyer cannot commit herself to a scoring rule, sellers' menu oers
depend on their beliefs over how likely the buyer will choose a jointly ex-post
ecient contract in a continuation equilibrium when it is one of the optimal con-
tracts for her within a menu. We establish the existence of a truthful monotone
10As in rst-price auctions with asymmetric bidders, the equilibrium may not be fully ex-post
ecient with asymmetric sellers even when the buyer always chooses a jointly ex-post ecient
contract from the winning seller's menu. This is because the buyer may not accept a menu
oered by a seller with whom she can maximize the joint ex-post surplus.
12equilibrium by taking two steps. As the rst step, this section considers a modi-
ed procurement in which (i) each seller i directly submits the buyer's payo bid
ui along with the characteristics xi of the good and (ii) the buyer knows sellers'
signals but each seller knows only his own signal. When the buyer accepts con-
tract (ui;xi) from seller i in this modied procurement, she chooses xi and makes
the monetary payment ti = u(xi) ui with probability 1 i so that (xi;u(xi) ui)
generates her a payo that exactly matches the payo bid ui that seller i sub-
mits. With probability i; the buyer chooses the jointly ex-post ecient contract
(x
i(s);u(x
i(s))   ui); at each s; that generates the payo bid ui submitted by
seller i. We complete the rst step by showing the existence of a monotone equilib-
rium in this modied procurement with any arbitrary  = [1;:::;N] 2 [0;1]N:
In the second step, we show that for a monotone equilibrium in this modied
procurement with any given ; there exists a payo-equivalent truthful mono-
tone equilibrium in the non-committed procurement in which the buyer chooses,
upon accepting a menu, a jointly ex-post ecient contract with probability i
and a jointly interim ecient contract with probability 1 i from each seller i's
equilibrium menu. Because there exists a truthful monotone equilibrium for any
given  2 [0;1]N; there exists a continuum of truthful monotone equilibria that
spans the entire space of [0;1]N:
4.1 Modied Procurement
In the modied procurement, each seller i submits a bid (ui;xi) from Ui  X;
where Ui = [0;1) [ fug with u < 0: Let ui be a payo bid and xi be a bid
for the characteristics of the good. When seller i submits u; he must submit
x along with it. Let (u;x) be the losing bid regardless of the bids submitted
by other sellers. If (ui;xi) 6= (u;x); it is called a serious bid. Assume that
each seller knows only his own signal but the buyer knows every seller's signal.
The buyer chooses a seller whose payo bid is the highest non-negative bid from
among all sellers' payo bids. If there are two or more sellers who submit the
highest non-negative payo bid, the buyer chooses either of them with equal
probability. When seller i wins the procurement with (ui;xi) 2 UiX, the buyer
buys the good with characteristics xi from seller i by paying ti = u(xi)   ui
with probability 1   i, but she buys the good with jointly ex-post ecient
characteristics x
i(s) 2 X
i (s) by paying ti = u(x
i(s))   ui for all s 2 [0;1]N with
probability i. We x  = [1;:::;N] as part of the procurement rule and it is
known to sellers.
We now examine the existence of a monotone equilibrium in the modied
procurement with any given  = [1;:::;N] 2 [0;1]N: Seller i's strategy is a
pair consisting of a payo bidding function, ui : [0;1] ! Ui, and a bidding
function for the characteristics of the good, xi : [0;1] ! X. Suppose that the
other sellers' strategies are non-decreasing: i.e., for all j 6= i, uj(s0
j)  uj(sj) and
13xj(s0
j)  xj(sj) if s0
j  sj. Seller i's interim payo associated with submitting
(ui;xi) is
Vi(ui;xi;u ijsi) =
(1   i)Pr(A(ui)jsi)E[(Ri(xi;S)   ui)i(ui;u i(S i))jA(ui);si]+
i Pr(A(ui)jsi)E[(Ri(x

i(S);S)   ui)i(ui;u i(S i))jA(ui);si]: (3)
Alternatively, we can express seller i's interim payo as follows. First, dene the
surplus between seller i and the buyer as
R






when seller i wins the procurement with a characteristics bid xi and an arbitrary
payo bid. Because of Assumption 1.(v)-(vi), R




i (xi;s) is non-decreasing in s whenever x0
i  xi. Seller i's interim




i (xi;S)   ui)i(ui;u i(S i))jA(ui);si]: (5)
Theorem 1 below establishes the existence of a monotone equilibrium in the
modied procurement with any given  = [1;:::;N] 2 [0;1]N.
Theorem 1 For any given  = [1;:::;N] 2 [0;1]N, the modied procurement
possesses a monotone equilibrium f(^ u1;^ x1);:::;(^ uN;^ xN)g.
Theorem 1 is closely related to Reny (2011) because a bid (ui;xi) is multidi-
mensional. Theorem 4.1 in Reny (2011) demonstrates that if certain conditions
(G.1-G.5 in Reny 2011) on players' actions, payo functions, and types are sat-
ised and each player's set of monotone best replies is nonempty and join-closed
whenever the others employ monotone pure strategies, then a Bayesian game
possesses a monotone equilibrium. In our modied procurement, let Bi(si) be
the set of best replies for seller i with signal si when the other sellers employ
monotone strategies so that Bi(si) includes every (ui;xi) that maximizes seller
i's interim payo given the other sellers' monotone strategies.
Bi() is monotone if for any monotone strategies of the other sellers (u i;x i),








i). This monotonicity is strictly weaker than the increasing property of best
replies in the strong order set (Milgrom and Shannon 1994). Bi() is join-closed
if (ui;xi) 2 Bi(si), and (u0
i;x0
i) 2 Bi(si) implies that (ui _ u0
i;xi _ x0
i) 2 Bi(si).
Reny establishes the existence of a monotone equilibrium ingeniously by uti-
lizing a xed-point theorem based on contractibility rather than the convexity
14of best replies (Athey 2001, McAdams 2006). Proposition 4.4 in Reny (2011)
provides a convenient sucient condition for the existence of a monotone equi-
librium: If the set of bids for each player is a lattice and each player's interim
payo function is weakly single crossing and weakly quasisupermodular, then
each player' set of monotone best replies is non-empty and join-closed. To see
this point, x the other sellers' monotone strategies. Each seller i's interim payo
function is weakly single crossing if, for all pairs of bids (u0
i;x0
i)  (ui;xi) and all















Each seller i's interim payo function is weakly quasisupermodular if, for all
(ui;xi);(u0
i;x0
i) 2 Ui  X and all si 2 [0;1];














The idea behind these conditions is straightforward. Consider any pair of best




i  si: Because
(ui;xi) 2 Bi(si); we have





By weakly single crossing, the inequality above implies
Vi(ui;xi;u ijs
0




























that Bi() is monotone. By setting up si = s0
i; the join-closedness follows as well.
However, a seller's interim payo function in the modied procurement may
fail to be weakly single crossing and/or weakly quasisupermodular at irrational
bids or rational bids with a positive probability of ties, as a seller's interim payo
function in rst price auctions with single dimensional bids (i.e., real numbers)
may fail to satisfy Athey's (2001) single crossing property.11 Reny and Zamir
(2004) avoid this problem and establish the existence of a monotone equilibrium
in a rst price auction with single dimensional bids by considering limits of ever
ner nite bid sets such that no two sellers have a common serious bid and by
11See the examples in Reny and Zamir (2004) that show the failure of the single crossing
property.
15recalling that single crossing is needed only at individually rational bids, i.e.,
\individually rational tieless single-crossing condition" (IRT-SCC).
For the existence of a monotone equilibrium in the modied procurement, this
paper proposes the \tieless supermodular condition" (TLS-SMC) and extends
Reny and Zamir's IRT-SCC. TLS-SMC, together with IRT-SCC, ensures both
the weakly single crossing condition and the weakly quasisupermodular condition
at individually rational tieless bids. We formally dene TLS-SMC in Denition
2 below.
Denition 2 The modied procurement satises TLS-SMC if, for each seller
i, any (ui;xi); (u0
i;x0
i) with Pr[u < maxj6=i uj(sj) = ui or u0
i] = 0 given any
















TLS-SMC implies that for any two tieless serious bids (ui;xi) and (u0
i;x0
i);





























The extension of Reny and Zamir's IRT-SCC is given below.
Denition 3 The modied procurement satises IRT-SCC if, for each seller i,
all pairs of (ui;xi) and (ui;xi) such that (i) ui  ui and xi  xi and (ii) Pr[u <
maxj6=i uj(sj) = ui or ui] = 0 given any non-decreasing payo bidding functions
u i for the other sellers, the following condition is satised: If Vi(ui;xi;u ijsi) 
0; then






i  si: If Vi(ui;xi;u ijs0
i)  0 for any s0





i) =) Vi(ui;xi;u ijsi)  Vi(ui;xi;u ijsi):
TLS-SMC requires that bids be serious and tieless but the individual ratio-
nality of bids (i.e., Vi(ui;xi;u ijsi)  0; Vi(ui;xi;u ijs0
i)  0) is also required
for IRT-SCC. Lemma 1 enables us to apply Theorem 4.1 in Reny (2011) when
proving the existence of a monotone equilibrium.
16Lemma 1 The modied procurement satises TLS-SMC and IRT-SCC.
We rst consider the nite modied procurement in which (i) the set of feasible
bids for each seller i is given by Un
i X; where Un
i is a nite set including u and
satises that for any ui 2 Un
i ; ui 6= 0 implies that ui  0, and (ii) Un
i and Un
j
do not have any common serious payo bids for any i 6= j: Therefore, TLS-SMC
and IRT-SCC are satised in the nite modied procurement. As in Reny and
Zamir (2004) and Athey (2001), each seller is restricted to submit the losing bid
(u;x) whenever his signal is in [0;"); where " = 1=n with n being a natural
number. In the nite modied procurement, n is xed so that [0;") has positive
measure but the measure of [0;") converges to zero as n ! 1.
Lemma 2 The nite modied procurement possesses a monotone equilibrium.
Proof. First, we show that the set of each seller i's best replies is monotone.
Consider Bi(si) and Bi(s0
i) for seller i, one under si and the other with s0
i such that
s0
i  si  " given the other sellers' monotone strategies. For Reny's monotonicity
of the set of seller i's best replies, it is sucient to show that whenever a best










i) 6= (u;x): Because (ui;xi) 6= (u;x) is in Bi(si) and
(u;x) is always feasible, we have





Note that both (ui;xi) and (u0
i;x0
i) are not (u;x): Because no two payo bid
sets have any serious bid in common, Pr[u < maxj6=i uj(sj) = ui or u0
i] = 0:
Furthermore, (ui;xi) is individually rational because it is in Bi(si): Invoking (8)
in IRT-SCC, (9) yields
Vi(ui;xi;u ijs
0





















so that (ui _ u0
i;xi _ x0




i) = (u;x): The interim payo for seller i with signal si;
associated with (ui;xi) 2 Bi(si) such that (ui;xi) 6= (u;x); is
Vi(ui;xi;u ijsi) = Pr(A(ui)jsi)E[R

i (xi;S)   uijA(ui);si]  0; (12)
where the inequality holds because (ui;xi) 2 Bi(si), the losing bid (u;x) is
always feasible for seller i; and ui 6= u does not tie with the other sellers' payo
17bids. Because every other seller j submits (u;x) when his signal is in [0;") and
the joint density of signals is strictly positive on [0;1]N, (ui;xi) 6= (u;x) wins
the procurement with positive probability, i.e., Pr(A(ui)jsi) > 0; for any si. It
follows that (12) implies
E[R

i (xi;S)   uijA(ui);si]  0: (13)
Because R




i (xi;S)   uijA(ui);s
0
i]  0: (14)







i (x;S)   ujA(ui);s
0
i]  0: (15)
Because (u0
i;x0
i) = (u;x) 2 Bi(s0















i) = 0 (16)
so that (ui _ u0
i;xi _ x0
i) = (ui;xi) 2 Bi(s0
i)




i) for any (u0
i;x0
i) 2 Bi(s0
i) and any s0
i and si such that
s0
i  si  ": Therefore, Reny's monotonicity of the set of seller i's best replies
goes through.
Examine the join-closedness of Bi(si). Reny's monotonicity of the set of seller
i's best replies states that if s0








i = si yields that (ui;xi) 2 Bi(si) and
(u0
i;x0
i) 2 Bi(si) imply (ui _ u0
i;xi _ x0
i) 2 Bi(si). Therefore, Bi(si) is join-closed.
Examine the non-emptiness of Bi(si): A characteristics bid xi that seller
i submits along with a payo bid ui does not aect the winning event, and
it is chosen with probability i conditional on seller i winning the procure-
ment. Furthermore, the buyer takes the monetary payment ti = u(xi)   ui
given, in this case, seller i's bid (ui;xi): If seller i with signal si submits a
payo bid ui for any ui 2 Un
i ; it is optimal for him to submit the jointly in-
terim ecient characteristics xe
i(A(ui);si;u i) in Xe
i (A(ui);si;u i) , as dened
in (2). Note that Xe
i (A(ui);si;u i) is non-empty. Because Un
i is a nite set and
Vi(ui;xe
i(A(ui);si;u i);u ijsi) is bounded, there exists a payo bid in Un
i that
maximizes Vi(ui;xe
i(A(ui);si;u i);u ijsi): Therefore, Bi(si) is non-empty.
Finally, Un
i is a nite set and a lattice. This property and assumption 1
lead Un
i  X to satisfy G.3 and G.4 in Reny (2011). Assumption 3.(i) and 2.(i)-
(ii) satisfy G.1, G.2, and G.5; therefore, Reny's conditions (G.1-G.5) on players'
actions, payo functions and types are all satised. The existence of a monotone





N)g be a monotone equilibrium in the modied pro-
curement game Gn; with an arbitrary  = [1;:::;N] 2 [0;1]N, in which seller
i's nite set of payo bids is denoted by Un
i and, hence, the set of payo and
characteristics bids is Un







is dense in Ui: The proof of Theorem 1 is completed by showing that the limit




N)g is a monotone equilibrium in
the modied procurement without restrictions on the sets of payo bids. The
proof also shows that the probability that, under the limit of sellers' equilib-
rium strategies, two or more sellers simultaneously submit the highest payo bid




N)g in the nite
modied procurement, xn
i (si) is necessarily jointly interim ecient conditional on
(A(un
i (si));si;un
 i) given no possibility of ties at any payo bid above u: Because
the probability that two or more sellers simultaneously submit the highest pay-
o bid above u is zero in the monotone equilibrium f(^ u1;^ x1);:::;(^ uN;^ xN)g, the
limit ^ xi(si) of xn
i (si) is also jointly interim ecient conditional on (A(^ ui(si));si;^ u i),
given no possibility of ties at the equilibrium payo bid ^ ui(si) above u.12
4.2 Existence of Truthful Monotone Equilibria
Theorem 2 below demonstrates that for any monotone equilibrium in the modied
procurement with any given  = [1;:::;N] 2 [0;1]N; we can nd a payo-
equivalent truthful monotone equilibrium in the non-committed procurement in
which each seller i believes that the buyer, upon accepting his equilibrium menu,
would optimally choose a jointly ex-post ecient contract with probability i and
a jointly interim ecient contract with probability 1   i.
Theorem 2 For a monotone equilibrium f(^ u1;^ x1);:::;(^ uN;^ xN)g in the modied
procurement with any given  = [1;:::;N] 2 [0;1]N; there exists a truthful
monotone equilibrium fm
1;:::;m








i) = Vi(^ ui(si);^ xi(si);^ u ijsi)
for each i and all si.
Fix a monotone equilibrium f(^ u1;^ x1);:::;(^ uN;^ xN)g in the modied procure-
ment with any given  = [1;:::;N] 2 [0;1]N: Menus are suciently general to
make it possible for each seller i to reveal his signal by oering a signal-contingent
menu. Let each seller i with signal si choose a menu m
i(si) that satises
(i) the maximum payo that the buyer can achieve by accepting m
i(si) is the
same as ^ ui(si) for all si 2 [0;1] and,




i(s))   ^ ui(si)) 2 D(m
i(si)) for all s 2 [0;1]N and,
(^ xi(si);u(^ xi(si))   ^ ui(si)) 2 D(m




i) if si 6= s0
i:
When each seller i oers a menu according to the strategy m
i, the buyer
can correctly infer the seller's true signal, allowing the buyer to optimally choose
a jointly ex-post ecient contract (x
i(s);u(x
i(s))   ^ ui(si)) 2 D(m
i(si)) upon
accepting m
i(si). Note that if a seller submits the losing bid in the modied
procurement, it is equivalent to oering menus that are not acceptable to the
buyer in the non-committed procurement. Even when it is optimal for a seller
not to win the procurement given the other sellers' menu strategies, he can reveal
his true signal in the non-committed procurement by making a non-acceptable
menu oer contingent on his signal.13
The key to Theorem 2 is to assign a continuation equilibrium (i.e., the buyer's
optimal contracting decision choice rule upon accepting a menu) in the non-
committed procurement. Suppose that each seller i with signal si believes that
if the buyer accepted his menu m
i(si), she would optimally choose a jointly
ex-post ecient contract in D(m
i(si)) with probability i and a jointly interim
ecient contract in D(m
i(si)) with probability 1 i. It is certainly an optimal
contracting decision choice rule for the buyer because the contracting decisions are
all in D(m




i and the buyer accepted it, she would optimally choose an arbitrary
optimal contract in D(m0
i) with probability one.14
Given this continuation equilibrium, it is straightforward to show that the
interim payo for each seller i with signal si associated with oering m
i(si) in the
non-committed procurement is the same as the one associated with submitting







i) = Vi(^ ui(si);^ xi(si);^ u ijsi): (17)
In order to show that there is no protable deviation for a seller in the non-
committed procurement, note that two types of deviations are available for each
seller i.
13One can consider the cases where a seller simply does not oer a menu when it is optimal
for him not to win the auction. If this happens for a positive measure of his signal, there is a
strictly positive probability that the buyer does not fully know all sellers' signals. In this case,
equilibrium will be only partially revealing. We believe that it is still possible to establish the
existence of partially revealing equilibria in which the buyer chooses a jointly ex-post ecient
contract with probability i from seller i's menu only if all sellers submit menus. The modied
procurement rule should be also properly modied so that the buyer chooses a jointly ex-post
ecient contract with probability i for seller i only if all sellers submit serious bids.
14In general, many continuation equilibria that the buyer chooses to follow o the equilibrium
path can prevent sellers from deviating. This is one of them.
20First of all, seller i with signal si can deviate to oer the menu m
i(s0
i) that
he would oer if he had a dierent signal, say s0
i: If the buyer accepted m
i(s0
i),




i;s i)   ^ ui(s0
i)) at each s i with probability
i and (^ xi(s0
i);u(^ xi(s0
i)) ^ ui(s0
i)) with probability 1 i as if seller i's signal were
s0
i.
In the modied procurement, seller i can deviate to submit the correct jointly
interim ecient characteristics xe
i(^ ui(s0
i);si;^ u i) along with the maximum payo
bid ^ ui(s0
i) that the menu m
i(s0
i) would induce for the buyer. Note that the
winning event A(^ ui(s0
i)) is the same whether seller i with signal si deviates to
m
i(s0
i) in the non-committed procurement or to (^ ui(s0
i);xe
i(^ ui(s0
i);si;^ u i)) in the
modied procurement. Furthermore, in the modied procurement, the buyer









i);si;^ u i))   ^ ui(s
0
i))





i(si;s i)   ^ ui(s
0
i))
at each s i with probability i, knowing that seller i's true signal is si: Therefore,
seller i's interim payo upon this deviation to (^ ui(s0
i);xe
i(^ ui(s0
i);si;^ u i)) in the
modied procurement is no less than his interim payo upon deviation to m
i(s0
i)















i);si;^ u i);^ u ijsi): (18)
Because f(^ u1;^ x1);:::;(^ uN;^ xN)g is an equilibrium in the modied procurement,







i);si;^ u i);^ u ijsi)  Vi(^ ui(si);^ xi(si);^ u ijsi) (19)
















for a.e. si so that it is not protable for seller i with a.e. si to deviate to any
menu that he would oer if he had a dierent signal.
Secondly, seller i can deviate to a menu mi that he would not oer under
any possible signal. According to the continuation equilibrium, the buyer would
choose an arbitrary optimal contract, say (xi;ti) 2 D(mi); with probability one
when she accepts the menu. Let ui be the payo that (xi;ti) induces for the buyer.
In the modied procurement, seller i can deviate to submit the bid (ui;xi). Seller
i's interim payo upon deviating to mi in the non-committed procurement is no
higher than his interim payo upon deviating to (ui;xi) because the buyer chooses
21a jointly ex-post ecient contract with probability i in the modied procurement






i)  Vi(ui;xi;^ u ijsi): (20)
Seller i's interim payo upon deviating to (ui;xi) in the modied procurement is
no less than his equilibrium interim payo
Vi(ui;xi;^ u ijsi)  Vi(^ ui(si);^ xi(si);^ u ijsi) (21)












for a.e. si so that it is not protable for seller i with a.e. si to deviate to a menu
that he would not oer under any possible signal.
The existence of the payo-equivalent truthful monotone equilibrium in the
non-committed procurement follows the existence of the corresponding monotone
equilibrium in the modied procurement. Because there exists a truthful mono-
tone equilibrium for any given  2 [0;1]N; there exists the continuum of truthful
monotone equilibria that spans [0;1]N; the entire space of sellers' beliefs on how
likely the buyer would choose either a jointly ex-post ecient contract or a jointly
interim ecient contract.
5 Menus and Interdependent Values
Under private values, no seller has an incentive to oer a menu of contracts
because a jointly ex-post ecient contract between a seller and the buyer depends
only on the seller's own signal. Given a seller's signal on his production costs
and the maximum payo that he is willing to yield to the buyer, it is (weakly)
dominant for him to oer a single jointly ex-post ecient contract even when
he can oer a menu. When sellers' signals have only private values, there is
no additional equilibrium allocation in the non-committed procurement where
sellers are allowed to oer menus and joint ex-post eciency is always ensured in
the non-committed procurement equilibrium where sellers oer single contracts.
The non-committed procurement where sellers oer single contracts is essentially
a rst scoring auction in which each seller submits a single contract, the seller
calculates scores for submitted contracts based on her payo function, and then
rewards procurement to the seller with the highest score.15
When sellers' signals on production costs have interdependent values, the rst
scoring auction in which each seller is allowed to submit only a single contract
15Che (1993) pointed out that the rst scoring auction can be implemented even when the
buyer has no commitment power.
22cannot reach the jointly ex-post ecient equilibrium because jointly ex-post ef-
cient characteristics of the good depend on all sellers' signals on production
costs. Given the maximum payo that a seller is willing to give to the buyer, the
best single contract that he can submit in the rst scoring auction is only jointly
interim ecient under interdependent values. Therefore, equilibrium in the rst
scoring auction is always only jointly interim ecient under interdependent val-
ues. This is why sellers should be able to oer menus of contracts to achieve joint
ex-post eciency. By reviewing and evaluating menus submitted by sellers, the
buyer would develop a solid idea about sellers' signals in a truthful monotone
equilibrium. Given the seller's signal and the maximum payo that he is willing
to give to the buyer, he can include all possible jointly ex-post ecient contracts
as the buyer's optimal contracts in his menu. In this way, when the buyer ac-
cepts the seller's menu, she can choose the jointly ex-post ecient contract as her
optimal contract from the menu given her belief on all sellers signals. However,
the lack of the buyer's commitment results in multiple continuation equilibria,
leading to a continuum of truthful monotone equilibria in the non-committed
procurement in which sellers oer menus under interdependent values.
Given the continuum of truthful monotone equilibria, equilibrium allocation is
bounded below by jointly interim eciency and above by joint ex-post eciency.
In following subsections, we study the stability of the equilibria in two fronts.
First of all, we study which equilibrium gives no incentives for jointly ex-post
renegotiation to the buyer and the winning seller. Secondly, even before the
buyer chooses a winning seller, a seller may consider deviating from his menu
(i.e., change his menu). Prior to the buyer's choice of a winning seller, sellers'
incentives to deviate depend on the continuation equilibrium that they believe
the buyer would follow following their deviations. Some equilibrium may be
supported only through a particular continuation equilibrium because a seller
may want to deviate under any other continuation equilibrium. In this sense,
we study how sensitive an equilibrium is to sellers' beliefs on the continuation
equilibrium or how ex-ante robust it is to sellers' beliefs on the continuation
equilibrium.
5.1 Ex-post Renegotiation
We have demonstrated that the degree of eciency in the non-committed pro-
curement with menus is dependent on sellers' beliefs on how the buyer will use
her information on production costs when choosing a contract from the menu.
Because the buyer cannot commit herself to scoring rules, there exists a contin-
uum of truthful monotone equilibria. It is important to nd out whether there is
an equilibrium that is more stable than others.
Fix a truthful monotone equilibrium fm
1;:::;m
N;g given a vector  =
[1;:::;N]: Let f(^ u1;^ x1);:::;(^ uN; ^ xN)g be its corresponding payo-equivalent
23monotone equilibrium in the modied procurement. Let seller i be the winning




i (^ xi(si);s)   ^ ui(si) = (1   i)Ri(^ xi(si);s) + iRi(x

i(s);s)   ui(si);
where ^ xi(si) = xe
i(A(^ ui(si));si;^ u i) so that Ri(^ xi(si);s) is the ex-post joint sur-
plus associated with the jointly interim ecient characteristics of the good given




jointly ex-post ecient surplus.
Suppose that the buyer chooses seller i as the winning seller given the sig-
nal vector s = [si;s i] in a truthful monotone equilibrium fm
1;:::;m
N;g.
The buyer receives the ex-post payo of ^ ui(si) for certain. However, the win-
ning seller's ex-post payo is Ri(^ xi(si);s)   ^ ui(si) with probability 1   i and
Ri(x
i(s);s)   ^ ui(si) with probability i, so that his expected ex-post payo is
R
i (^ xi(si);s) ui(si): After the buyer selects the winning seller, the buyer and the
winning seller may agree to renegotiate the contract if it is mutually benecial
given a signal vector s: If there is no contract that is mutually benecial to the
buyer and the winning seller given the signal vector, then the equilibrium is said
to be jointly ex-post renegotiation-proof.
It is clear that Ri(x
i(s);s)  Ri(^ xi(si);s) for all s = [si;s i] because x
i(s)
is jointly ex-post ecient and ^ xi(si) is only jointly interim ecient. We assume
that there exists Zi  [0;1] and Z i  [0;1]N 1, each with positive measure such
that (i) for all si 2 Zi and all s i 2 Z i;
Ri(x

i(si;s i);si;s i) > Ri(^ xi(si);si;s i): (22)
and (ii) for all si 2 Zi,
Pr(A(^ ui(si))jsi) > 0 (23)
If this assumption is not satised, then there is no sensible distinction between
interdependent values and private values in equilibrium. If the buyer chooses a
jointly interim ecient contract with positive probability 1 i from the winning
seller i, i < 1; then the ex-post surplus Ri(^ xi(si);si;s i) between the winning
seller i and the buyer is strictly less than the jointly ex-post ecient surplus
for all si 2 Zi and all s i 2 Z i: It implies that with positive probability, the
winning seller i and the buyer can renegotiate in such a way that both of them
are strictly better o by agreeing on a jointly ex-post ecient contract. When a
truthful monotone equilibrium fm
1;:::;m
N;g is jointly ex-post ecient (i.e.,
i = 1 for all i), one cannot nd an alternative contract on which the buyer
and the winning seller can mutually agree at any realized signal vector given the
payos that they would receive from the buyer's original choice of a contract
from the menu. It implies that only the jointly ex-post ecient equilibrium, i.e.,
fm
1;:::;m
N;g with i = 1 for all i; is jointly ex-post renegotiation-proof.
245.2 Ex-Ante Robustness
Joint ex-post renegotiation is a notion for examining whether the buyer and the
winning seller can improve upon their renegotiation after the winning seller is
determined. A seller may consider deviation from his menu even before the buyer
chooses the winning seller. Given the multiplicity of continuation equilibrium,
suppose that a truthful equilibrium is based on a continuation equilibrium in
which the buyer always chooses a jointly interim ecient contract from seller 1's
menu upon accepting it but always chooses a jointly ex-post ecient contract
from other sellers' menus upon accepting one of them. Given this particular
continuation equilibrium, no sellers have incentives to deviate from their menus.
However, if seller 1 believed, for example, that the buyer would in fact always
choose a jointly ex-post ecient contract from his menu upon his deviation, he
would deviate to submit a menu more aggressively in the sense that his new menu
oers a higher payo to the buyer than his original menu does. Not only does
such a deviation show that equilibrium menus (and subsequently equilibrium
contracts) in some equilibria are not robust to the possibility that the buyer
would choose an alternative continuation equilibrium for her contract choice, but
it also implies that the equilibrium prediction on how likely each seller would win
is not ex-ante robust because more aggressive menu oers from seller 1 make it
more likely for him to win and less likely for other sellers to win. In this sense, it
is important to examine how ex-ante robust an equilibrium is to (sellers' beliefs
on) the continuation equilibrium.
A truthful monotone equilibrium fm
1;:::;m
N;g is ex-ante robust16 to
some alternative continuation equilibria if there exists a non-empty set of al-
ternative continuation equilibria C  C with  = [
1;:::;
N] = 2 C such that,














Fix a truthful monotone equilibrium fm
1;:::;m
N;g: Suppose that seller i with
si considers a deviation. He does not have incentives to deviate when he continues
to hold the equilibrium belief on the continuation equilibrium, : Because there
are multiple continuation equilibria, a seller's incentives for deviation dier across
his beliefs on the continuation equilibrium. Even when seller i with signal si
believes that the buyer might not follow the continuation equilibrium ; he does
not have an incentive to deviate as long as he believes the buyer would follow an
alternative continuation equilibrium 0 in C that satises (24).
Theorem 3 Any truthful monotone equilibrium fm
1;:::;m
N;g with i > 0
for all i is ex-ante robust to some alternative continuation equilibria.
16The notion of robustness follows the strong robustness adopted for competing mechanism
games (Han 2007)
25Proof. Fix an arbitrary truthful monotone equilibrium fm
1;:::;m
N;g with
i > 0 for all i: Let fm
1;:::;m
N;g be the payo-equivalent equilibrium for a
monotone equilibrium f(^ u1;^ x1);:::;(^ uN;^ xN)g in the modied procurement.
Consider the situation in which seller i with signal si is contemplating a
deviation to a menu mi that can induce the maximum payo ui for the buyer
in the modied procurement. Suppose that the buyer follows an alternative
continuation equilibrium 0: When seller i with signal si deviates to a menu mi
and the array of the other sellers' menus are m
 i(s i) given s i; the buyer chooses









i to an arbitrary contract (xi;u(xi)   ui) in D(mi) and probability 0
i to
(~ xi(s i);u(~ xi(s i))   ui) 2 D(mi), where 0
i 2 [0;i) and ~ xi : [0;1]N ! X is an
arbitrary mapping satisfying (~ xi(s i);u(~ xi(s i))   ui) 2 D(mi) for each s i:
Suppose that seller i with signal si deviates to a menu mi. If the buyer follows








i)Pr(A(ui)jsi)E[(Ri(xi;S)   ui)i(ui;^ u i(S i))jA(ui);si]+

0
i Pr(A(ui)jsi)E[(Ri(~ xi(S i);S)   ui)i(ui;^ u i(S i))jA(ui);si]: (25)
Vi(^ ui(si);^ xi(si);^ u ijsi) is the equilibrium interim payo in the modied procure-
ment and hence we have, for a.e. si;
Vi(^ ui(si);^ xi(si);^ u ijsi)  Vi(ui;xi;^ u ijsi)
= (1   i)Pr(A(ui)jsi)E[(Ri(xi;S)   ui)i(ui;^ u i(S i))jA(ui);si]+
i Pr(A(ui)jsi)E[(Ri(x

i(S);S)   ui)i(ui;^ u i(S i))jA(ui);si]: (26)
Because 0
i < i and x
i(s) is a BEE action, we have
Vi(ui;xi;^ u ijsi)
 (1   
0





i(S);S)   ui)i(ui;^ u i(S i))jA(ui);si]: (27)
Because x
i(s) is a BEE action, (25) leads to
(1   
0











(26), (27) and (28) imply that, for a.e. si;





26Because Vi(^ ui(si);^ xi(si);^ u ijsi) = Vi(m
i(si);m
 ijsi;













Theorem 3 shows that a truthful monotone equilibrium is ex-ante robust to a
set of alternative continuation equilibria as long as the buyer chooses a jointly ex-
post ecient contract from the winning seller's menu with positive probability.17
However, not every truthful monotone equilibrium is ex-ante robust to all con-
tinuation equilibria. To see this point, consider a truthful monotone equilibrium
fm
1;:::;m
N; g that does not induce joint ex-post eciency, i.e., i < 1 for
some i: Let fm
1;:::;m
N;g be the payo-equivalent equilibrium for a mono-
tone equilibrium f(^ u1;^ x1);:::;(^ uN; ^ xN)g in the modied procurement. Given
the assumption for (22) and (23), it is clear to see that there exists Zi  [0;1]
with positive measure that satises, for all si 2 Zi,
E[(Ri(^ xi(Si);S)   ^ ui(Si))i(^ u(S))jA(ui);si] <
E[(Ri(x

i(S);S)   ^ ui(Si))i(^ u(S))jA(ui);si] (30)
and Pr(A(^ ui(si))jsi) > 0: The right-hand side of (30) is seller i's interim payo
when the buyer chooses a jointly ex-post ecient contract upon accepting seller
i's menu and the left-hand side is seller i's interim payo when the buyer chooses
a jointly interim ecient contract. Theorem 3 implies that even when a truthful
monotone equilibrium fails to induce joint ex-post eciency, it is ex-ante robust to
a set of alternative continuation equilibria if i > 0 for all i. However, if a truthful
monotone equilibrium does not induce joint ex-post eciency, we can identify
alternative continuation equilibria in which seller i can gain upon deviation. For
seller i, whose signal si is in Zi; consider the following deviation to mi 6= m
i(si)
such that
(a) the maximum payo that the buyer can achieve by accepting mi is the same
as the one ^ ui(si) that she would have achieved by accepting m
i(si) and
(b) (^ xi(si);u(^ xi(si))  ^ ui(si)) 2 D(mi) and (x
i(si;s i);u(x
i(si;s i))  ^ ui(si)) 2
D(mi) for all s i 2 [0;1]N 1:
Suppose that the buyer plays an alternative continuation equilibrium 0: Upon
seller i's deviation to mi 6= m








17Note that a truthful monotone equilibrium is based on a uniform-tie breaking rule. We
can show that it is always robust to alternative tie-breaking rules in which the buyer does not
choose a deviating bidder's menu in the case of ties.
27^ ui(si)) with 0
i > i. In this case, the interim payo Vi(mi;m
 ijsi;0
i) for seller i














i(S);S)   ^ ui(Si))i(^ u(S))jA(ui);si]: (31)







i) = Vi(^ ui(si);^ xi(si);^ u ijsi) =
(1   i)Pr(A(ui)jsi)E[(Ri(^ xi(Si);S)   ^ ui(Si))i(^ u(S))jA(ui);si]+
i Pr(A(ui)jsi)E[(Ri(x

i(S);S)   ^ ui(Si))i(^ u(S))jA(ui);si]: (32)
Applying 0












Therefore, when the buyer chooses a jointly ex-post ecient contract from the
winning seller's menu with a probability less than one in a continuation equilib-
rium, one can always nd an alternative continuation equilibrium in which the
buyer chooses a jointly ex-post ecient contract with higher probability and it
provides the seller with incentives to deviate.
Theorem 4 shows that if a truthful monotone equilibrium is based on the
continuation equilibrium in which the buyer always chooses a jointly ex-post
ecient contract from the winning seller's menu, it is ex-ante robust to every
continuation equilibrium that the buyer chooses to follow for her contract choice.
Theorem 4 A truthful monotone equilibrium fm
1;:::;m
N;g with i = 1 for
all i is ex-ante robust to every continuation equilibrium.
Proof. Consider the truthful monotone equilibrium fm1
1;:::;m1
N;1g with 1 =
[1;1;:::;1]: Note that it corresponds to a monotone equilibrium f(^ u1;^ x1);:::;(^ uN;
^ xN)g in the modied procurement with i = 1 for all i. Suppose that seller i
with signal si deviates to an arbitrary menu mi that can induce the maximum
payo ui to the buyer in the non-committed procurement. When seller i deviates
to the payo bid ui along with an action bid xi in the modied procurement, his
interim payo upon such a deviation satises
Vi(^ ui(si);^ xi(si);^ u ijsi)  Vi(ui;xi;^ u ijsi) (33)
for a.e. si because (^ ui();^ xi()) is bidder i's equilibrium strategy. Note that the
buyer always chooses a jointly ex-post ecient contract in the modied procure-
ment and that the winning event for seller i is the same whether he deviates to mi
28in the non-committed procurement or to the corresponding payo bid ui along
with an action bid xi in the modied procurement. Therefore, we have that, for
any continuation equilibrium 0 = [0
1;:::;0
N] and all mi,












i ) = Vi(^ ui(si);^ xi(si);^ u ijsi);












given any continuation equilibrium 0 = [0
1;:::;0
N] and all mi: Therefore, the
truthful monotone equilibrium fm
1;:::;m
N;g is ex-ante robust to every con-
tinuation equilibrium if  = [1;:::;1].
Not only is the jointly ex-post ecient equilibrium jointly ex-post renegotiation-
proof, it provides no incentives for sellers to deviate regardless of the continuation
equilibrium that they believe the buyer would choose. Hence the equilibrium con-
tract that the buyer chooses in the jointly ex-post ecient equilibrium is both
ex-ante and ex-post stable and subsequently the jointly ex-post ecient equi-
librium provides a stable prediction on how likely each seller would be to win
procurement.
The jointly ex-post ecient truthful monotone equilibrium is jointly ex-post
renegotiation-proof regardless of the tie-breaking rule because it considers whether
there exists a mutually benecial alternative contract for the winning seller and
the buyer after the winning seller is determined. While it, like any other truth-
ful monotone equilibria, is ex-ante robust to some alternative tie-breaking rules,
it may not be ex-ante robust to every alternative tie-breaking rule under inter-
dependent values. The tie-breaking rule does not have any bite if a deviating
seller's menu has no possibility of ties with the other bidders' menus in terms of
the buyer's maximum payo that the menus can induce. However, it can aect a
seller's incentive to deviate to a menu that could tie with the other sellers' menus
with positive probability. Suppose that the the buyer follows an alternative tie-
breaking rule in which she chooses the deviating seller's menu for sure in \good
news" events in which a lot of the other sellers' menus may tie with the deviating
bidder's menu with positive probability. If the payo upon always winning a tie
conditional on \good news" events is suciently high and a seller believes that
the buyer would follow such an alternative continuation equilibrium, he may have
incentives to deviate to a menu with the possibility of ties.18
18The existence of a monotone equilibrium under an alternative tie-breaking rule is yet to be
established. The jointly ex-post ecient truthful monotone equilibrium is robust to both all
296 Discussion
Equilibrium analysis of non-committed procurement with asymmetric sellers, in-
terdependent values, and aliated signals is technically very challenging because
it is not easy to establish the existence of an (monotone) equilibrium given the
complexity of each seller's strategy space (i.e., the set of all possible menus of
contracts). By extending Reny and Zamir's IRT-SCC and introducing TLS-SMC,
this paper demonstrates that both the weakly single crossing condition and the
weakly quasisupermodular condition in Reny (2011) are ensured at individually
rational tieless bids. This leads us not only to establish the existence of truth-
ful monotone equilibria but also enables us to study the nature of equilibrium
allocations in non-committed procurement under interdependent values in very
general environments.
For the jointly ex-post ecient equilibrium under interdependent values, it is
essential for potential sellers to be able to submit a menu of contracts because the
equilibrium is only jointly interim ecient when a seller is restricted to submit
a single contract. However, by allowing sellers to submit menus of contracts, the
buyer induces a continuum of truthful monotone equilibria in such a way that
each truthful monotone equilibrium depends on the continuation equilibrium that
sellers believe the buyer would follow for her choice of a contract from the winning
seller's menu. We show that the truthful monotone equilibrium is bounded above
by the joint ex-post eciency and below by the joint interim eciency.
In the jointly ex-post ecient equilibrium, sellers believe that the buyer will
always choose a jointly ex-post ecient contract if it is available as an optimal
contract in the menu, and they submit menus accordingly. Because the jointly ex-
post ecient equilibrium is both jointly ex-post renegotiation-proof and ex-ante
robust to any continuation equilibrium, it is very appealing and we may expect it
to be the most plausible equilibrium. With a lack of the buyer's commitment, it
should be important in practice for the buyer to establish her reputation in a way
that leads sellers to believe she would choose a jointly ex-post ecient contract
when negotiating with the winning seller.
Abstracting from reality, our paper provides a positive theory of non-committed
procurement in which each seller submits a menu of contracts. In practice, in non-
committed procurement, each seller may submit a lengthy proposal that includes
many dierent aspects of procurement and many possible potential contracts Fur-
thermore it may be a time-consuming process for the buyer (e.g., government)
to review and evaluate sellers' proposals. By reviewing and evaluating sellers'
proposals, the buyer develops an accurate idea about their signals on production
costs in equilibrium. Therefore, the buyer can act as an information collector
continuation equilibria and all tie-breaking rules only if every bidder's feasible menus have no
possibility of ties with the other bidders' equilibrium menus. However, it is not known when
this condition is satised.
30in the non-committed procurement. Even without commitment on the buyer's
side, sellers' proposals can lead to the jointly ex-post ecient equilibrium under
interdependent values if they believe that the buyer will exploit her information
during her negotiation with the winning seller. As an information collector, it is
practically important for the buyer to establish a reputation that the acquired
information on all seller's production costs would be used when negotiating a
contract with the winning seller. It suggests sensitive roles for regulations (e.g.,
Federal Acquisition Regulation in the U.S.) or oversight agencies (e.g., Oce
of the Procurement Ombudsman in Canada). Even when the government may
not commit to any mechanisms or scoring rules, it can establish regulations or
oversight agencies for well-dened procedures of non-committed procurement.
They are important not only in preventing favoritism or corruption, and ensur-
ing competitive bidding, but also in providing and maintaining the government's
reputation that its additional information on production costs would be used
when negotiating a contract with the winning seller. This makes potential sellers
submit their proposals, expecting the jointly ex-post ecient equilibrium.
The result also gives us new insight into why multiple open bidding is im-
portant in practice especially under interdependent values. Recently, Canada
announced a $9 billion plan to purchase sixty ve F-35 ghter jets from Lock-
heed Martin. It was heavily criticized because the federal government chose F-35
ghter jets through exclusive bargaining with Lockheed Martin without compet-
itive bidding from other potential sellers. The potential cost of such an exclusive
bargaining goes much deeper. The announced plan includes not only the sim-
ple purchase of the ghter jets but also the modication of the jets, long-term
maintenance, and training that are tailored specic to the needs of Canadian Air
Force. The costs of modication, long-term maintenance, and training may not
be fully known to the buyer or a single seller. As the buyer invites proposals
from many potential sellers and evaluates the proposals, she learns about costs
that are not necessarily known to the winning seller. Subsequently, the buyer can
negotiate with the winning seller with the knowledge acquired from other sellers'
proposals. The federal government of Canada missed such a valuable opportu-
nity by exclusively bargaining with Lockheed Martin.19 In this light, this paper
can also be viewed as oering a new aspect of competitive bidding under inter-
dependent values, in the sense that as the buyer reviews and evaluates sellers'
proposals, she learns more about production costs and can use this knowledge
19The minister of defense defended the exclusive bargaining with Lockheed Martin by pointing
out that they knew that the F-35 ghter jet is the best ghter jet on the market so that it was
not necessary to consider any other ghter jets. Not only does such a remark reect the lack
of understanding of procurement under interdependent values, but it also does not help the
government to establish a reputation for gathering and learning additional information from
many sellers' proposals and using that information during the negotiation with the winning
seller.
31during negotiation with the winning seller.
APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1. Following Reny and Zamir (2004), call a product of N real intervals in
Rk with k  1 - each of which can be closed, open or half-open - a cell. For any cells A and
A0 in Rk, A0  A if the lower (upper) endpoint of each interval in the product dening A is no
greater than the lower (upper) endpoint of the corresponding interval in the product dening
A0.
TLS-SMC: Consider any (ui;xi) and (u0
i;x0
i) such that Pr[u < maxj6=i uj(sj) = ui or u0
i] = 0
given any non-decreasing payo bidding functions u i. In this way, we can ensure that if seller
i's payo bid is ui or u0
i, then the probability that seller i's payo bid is the highest non-
negative payo bid is equal to the probability that seller i's payo bid is the unique highest
non-negative payo bid. Because f > 0 and the event that seller i's payo bid is uniquely
the highest depends only on the other sellers' signals, this event has positive probability if
and only if it has positive probability on every si 2 [0;1]: Hence we can respectively dene
the event that u0
i is a winning payo bid and the event that ui is a winning payo bid as
A0 =

s i 2 [0;1]N : maxj6=i uj(sj) < u0
i
	
and A = fs i 2 [0;1]N : maxj6=i uj(sj) < uig:
Without loss of generality, let u0
i  ui and hence ui _ u0
i = u0
i and ui ^ u0
i = ui: Because ui or
u0










Vi(ui;xi;u ijsi)   Vi(ui ^ u0
i;xi ^ x0
i;u ijsi) = Pr(Ajsi)E[R
i (xi;S)   R
i (xi ^ x0
i;S)jA;si]:




i;u ijsi) is the dierence in seller i's interim
payos associated with two action bids xi_x0
i and x0




i;u ijsi) is the dierence in seller i's interim payos associated with two action
bids xi and xi ^ x0
i given his payo bid ui: Because Pr(A0jsi)  Pr(Ajsi), TLS-SMC holds if
E[R




i (xi;S)   R
i (xi ^ x0
i;S)jA;si]: (35)
We rst compare E[R









i  ui and the other sellers employ non-decreasing strategies, both A0 and A are
products of cells with zero lower endpoints, but the upper endpoint of the cell for each seller
j's signal in A0 is no less than the upper endpoint of the corresponding cell in A: Furthermore,
R
i (xi _ x0
i;s)   R
i (x0
i;s) is non-decreasing in s i: Therefore, we can directly invoke Theorem
5 in Milgrom and Weber (1982) so that
E[R













i (xi;S)   R
i (xi ^ x0
i;S)jA; si]: Because
R
i is supermodular at each s; it is clear that
E[R




i (xi;S)   R
i (xi ^ x0
i;S)jA;si]: (37)
Combining (36) and (37) yields (35) and hence TLS-SMC holds.
32IRT-SCC: This proof closely follows the proof of IRT-SCC in Reny and Zamir (2004). To
show IRT-SCC, x (ui;xi) and (ui;xi) with ui  ui and xi  xi and, for all j 6= i; x non-
decreasing payo bidding functions so that Pr[u < maxj6=i uj(Sj) = ui or ui] = 0: As in proof
of TLS-SMC, this makes the event that ui is a winning payo bid as
A =










i (xi;S)   uijA;si

is non-decreasing in si whenever A has positive proba-
bility.
Suppose that (ui;xi) wins with positive probability. This means that (ui;xi) also wins with
positive probability because ui  ui; hence A has positive probability. As in Reny and Zamir
(2004), partition A as follows. For every subset J of f1;:::;Ngnfig; dene
A(J) = A \ fs i 2 [0;1]N 1 : 8j 6= i;uj(sj)  ui i j 2 Jg:
Ignoring ties, A(J) is the event that (ui;xi) loses against precisely those sellers in J: Because
A(J) is contained in A, (ui;xi) wins against every j 6= i in each event A(J): Also, A(;), being
the event that (ui;xi) loses against no one, is the event that (ui;xi) wins the procurement
and so has positive probability. IRT-SCC holds if the following statement holds for all pairs of
s0
i  si: When E

R






i (xi;S)   ui   (R






i (xi;S)   ui   (R










i (xi;S)   ui   (R







i (xi;S)   ui   (R
i (xi;S)   ui)IA(;)jA;si

 0: (39)
By Theorem 5 in Milgrom and Weber (1982), E

R
i (xi;S)   uijA;si





i (xi;S)   uijA;s0
i

 0: Subsequently, if E[(R
i (xi;S)   ui)IA(;)jA;s0
i] < 0; equivalently,
E[R
i (xi;S)   uijA(;);s0
i] < 0; then (38) trivially holds because the second dierence is non-
negative. Therefore, it is sucient to establish (38) and (39) when E

(R





i (xi;S)   uijA(;);s0







i (xi;S)   ui   (R







i (xi;S)   ui   (R
i (xi;S)   ui)IA(;)jA;si

: (40)
Let i(s) = R
i (xi;s)   ui   (R
i (xi;s)   ui)IA(;): Note that i(s) is non-decreasing in si.
According to Lemma A.1 in Reny and Zamir (2004), it is therefore enough to show that i(s0
i;)
is cell-wise non-decreasing with respect to f(s ijA;s0
i), where f(s ijA;s0
i) is the density function
for s i conditional on (A;s0
i). By considering the above nite partition, fA(J)g; of A into cells,
we can restrict attention to those subsets of J such that A(J) is non-empty. For any non-empty




i (xi;S)   ui   (R




i (xi;S)   uijA(J);s0
i]: (41)
33If A(J0)  A(J); the inequality relation
E[R
i (xi;S)   uijA(J0);s0
i]  E[R
i (xi;S)   uijA(J);s0
i] (42)
follows from Theorem 5 in Milgrom and Weber (1982). (41) and (42) imply that for any pair




i (xi;S)   ui   (R







i (xi;S)   ui   (R




Furthermore, for every A(J)  A(;); we have
E[R
i (xi;S)   uijA(J);s0
i]  E[R
i (xi;S)   uijA(;);s0
i]
 E[R
i (xi;S)   ui   (R
i (xi;S)   ui)jA(;);s0
i]; (44)
where the rst inequality follows from Theorem 5 in Milgrom and Weber (1982) and the second
follows because E[R
i (xi;S)   uijA(;);s0





i (xi;S)   ui   (R





i (xi;S)   ui   (R
i (xi;S)   ui)jA(;);s0
i]. (45)
Finally, (43) and (45) show that i(si;) is cell-wise non-decreasing with respect to f(s ijA;s0
i):
Proof of Theorem 1 The existence of a monotone equilibrium in the modied procurement
with nite sets of payo bids is established in Lemma 2. The proof of Theorem 1 extends part
2 of the proof of Theorem 2.1 in Reny and Zamir (2004) to show that the limit of the modied
procurements with nite sets of payo bids has a monotone equilibrium without restrictions
on the sets of payo bids. For n = 1;2;:::; let Gn denote the modied procurement in which
seller i's nite set of payo bids is denoted by Un
i and hence the set of payo bids and actions
is Un






i is dense in Ui. Let (un
i ;xn
i ) be seller
i's equilibrium strategy in the modied procurement Gn.
Consider the limit strategies. Because R(;s) is bounded above at each s 2 [0;1]N with
Assumption 2.(iii), there exists ~ u > 0 such that R(x;s)   ~ u < 0 for all (x;s) 2 X[0;1]N:
Therefore, un
i () is bounded above by ~ u and below by u, and it is also non-decreasing in si.
By Helley's Selection Theorem, we then have that un
i (si) ! ^ ui(si) for a.e. si 2 [0;1], where
^ ui() is a non-decreasing function.
Because xn
i () is non-decreasing in si, and the conditions G.1-G.3 in Reny (2011), a general-
ized Helley's selection Theorem (Lemma A.10 in Reny 2011) implies that xn
i (si) ! ^ xi(si) for a.e.
si 2 [0;1]; where ^ xi() is a non-decreasing function. We shall prove that f(^ u1;^ x1);:::;(^ uN;^ xN)g
is a monotone equilibrium in the modied procurement. Ties should be carefully handled in
two fronts.
In point 1, we show that, given the limit bidding functions ^ u i of the other sellers, seller
i's interim payo associated with any bid (ui;xi) can be approximated arbitrarily well or he
can improve upon his payo by slightly increasing his payo bid, given the same action bid xi,
that does not tie the other sellers' payo bids with probability one. This is illustrated in (46).
In point 2, we are concerned that the possibility of ties may lead the limiting payos to
dier from the payos at the limit strategies. It is shown that the probability that, under ^ u,
34two or more sellers simultaneously submit the highest payo bid above u is zero so that the
limiting payo for seller i with si is always obtained by employing the limit bids (^ ui(si);^ xi(si))
given the other sellers' limit bidding functions, ^ u i.
Point 1: Given the other sellers' non-decreasing payo bidding functions ^ u i; let A(ui) =
fs i 2 [0;1]N 1 : maxj6=i ^ uj(sj)  uig: Suppose that seller i with si submits a bid (ui;xi) such
that Vi(ui;xi;^ u ijsi)  0. Let E[jsi;Hi] = 0 if Pr(Hijsi) = 0: Then, the following relations
hold:
0  Vi(ui;xi;^ u ijsi) (46)
= Pr(A(ui)jsi)E[(R
i (xi;S)   ui)i(ui;^ u i(S i))jA(ui);si]
 Pr(A(ui)jsi)E[R
i (xi;S)   uijA(ui);si]E[i(ui;^ u i(S i))jA(ui);si]
 Pr(A(ui)jsi)E[R






where the inequality on the third line follows from Theorem 23 in Milgrom and Weber (1982)
because both R
i (xi;s) ui and 1 i(ui;^ u i(s i)) are non-decreasing in s i given the uniform
tie-breaking rule. The inequality on the fourth line holds because
Pr(A(ui)jsi) > 0 =) 0 < E[i(ui;^ u i(S i))jA(ui);si]  1
given the uniform tie-breaking rule: The equality on the fth line holds because seller i can
approximate his payo arbitrarily well by submitting a slightly higher payo bid u0
i; with the
same characteristics bid xi; that is never one of the at most countably many mass points of
maxj6=i ^ uj(Sj).
Point 2: Recall that R(x;s)   u = 0 for all i and all s. When ui = u; dene u0
i # ui to
mean u0
i = u. Note that u 2 Un
i : Therefore, for every i and a.e. si such that ^ ui(si) > u and
Pr[maxj6=i ^ uj(Sj)  ^ ui(Si)jsi] > 0; the following holds when n is large enough:
0  E[R
i (xn












j (Sj)  ^ ui(si) + ]
! E[R
i (^ xi(si);S)   ^ ui(si)jsi;max
j6=i
^ uj(Sj)  ^ ui(si)]:
^ ui(si) > u implies that un
i (si) is a serious payo bid when n is large enough. This implies
that (i) it wins with positive probability given the strategy restriction and (ii) the right hand
side in the rst line is seller i's payo because ties in Gn cannot occur at serious payo bids.
Therefore, the rst line of (47) holds. The second line follows for any  > 0 by Theorem 5 in
Milgrom and Weber (1982). For the third line, note that R
i (;s) is continuous by Assumption
1.(i)-(ii). The third line follow by taking the limit rst as n ! 1 and then as  # 0 along
a sequence such that ^ ui(si) +  is never one of the at most countably many mass points of
maxj6=i ^ uj(Sj): This ensures that the rst limit in n exists for each such .
Now we consider the limit payos. Because i(ui;u i) is non-decreasing in ui and non-
increasing in u i; i(un(s)) is a sequence of functions each of which is monotone in each
of its arguments, s1;:::;sN; and is non-decreasing in si and non-increasing in s i: Hence,
by Helley's Theorem, there exists i : [0;1]N ! [0;1] that is non-decreasing in si and non-
increasing in s i such that i(un(s)) ! i(s) for a.e. s 2 [0;1]N: Consequently, we have P
i i(s) = 1 for a.e. s 2 [0;1]N: One can think of i(s) as a surrogate tie-breaking rule
35that is a function of the vector of signals alone. Then, the equilibrium interim payo for






i (si))i(un(S))jsi] converges to
E[(R
i (^ xi(si);S)   ^ ui(si))i(S)jsi] by the dominated convergence theorem.
Because each ^ uj(Sj) has at most countably many mass points and Un
i becomes dense in













for n   n: The rst and second lines in (48) hold because we can choose  ui such that the
probability that any ^ uj(Sj) is equal to  ui is arbitrarily small. The third line holds because  ui
is feasible in Un
i for n   n and un
i is the equilibrium bidding function for seller i. Because " is











i (^ xi(si);S)   ^ ui(si))i(S)jsi]: (49)
Letting A(^ ui(si)) = fs i 2 [0;1]N 1 : maxj6=i ^ uj(sj)  ^ ui(si)g, that for a.e. si such that
^ ui(si) > u;
0  E[(R
i (^ x(si);S)   ^ ui(si))i(S)jsi] (50)
= Pr(A(^ ui(si))jsi)E[(R
i (^ xi(si);S)   ^ ui(si))i(S)jA(^ ui(si));si]
 Pr(A(^ ui(si))jsi)E[R
i (^ x(si);S)   ^ ui(si)jA(^ ui(si));si]E[i(S)jA(^ ui(si));si]
 Pr(A(^ ui(si))jsi)E[R
i (^ x(si);S)   ^ ui(si)jA(^ ui(si));si]
= lim
"#0




The inequality on the rst line in (50) follows from (49). The equality on the second line is
immediately apparent because i(s) = 0 for a.e. s i = 2 A(^ ui(si)). The inequality on the third
line follows from Theorem 23 in Milgrom and Weber (1982). The inequality on the fourth line
holds because i(s) 2 [0;1], and by (47), Pr(A(^ ui(si))jsi) > 0 implies that E[R
i (^ x(si);S)  
^ ui(si)jA(^ ui(si));si]  0: The equality on the fth line holds, as on the fth line in (46), because
seller i can approximate his payo arbitrarily well by submitting a slightly higher payo bid
^ ui(si) that, with probability one, does not tie the others' payo bids, along with ^ x(si). By the
last inequality in (50) and the inequality in (49), the second, third, and fourth inequalities in
(50) must be equalities.
Now we prove that E[i(S)jA(^ ui(si));si] = 1 for a.e. si that satises Pr(A(^ ui(si))jsi) > 0:
Because the third inequality in (50) holds with equality, we have, for a.e. si with Pr(A(^ ui(si))jsi) >
0; we have
0  E[R
i (^ xi(si);S)   ^ ui(si)jA(^ ui(si));si]E[i(S)jA(^ ui(si));si]
= E[R
i (^ xi(si);S)   ^ ui(si)jA(^ ui(si));si]: (51)
36For a.e. si and s0
i such that si > s0
i, Pr(A(^ ui(si))jsi) > 0 and Pr(A(^ ui(s0
i))js0









i);S)   ^ ui(s0
i)jA(^ ui(s0
i));si]. (52)
The rst inequality in (52) holds by (51). Because R
i (xi;s)   ui is strictly increasing in si,
Theorem 5 in Milgrom and Weber (1982) implies the second inequality in (52).




i) + ";^ xi(s0





Vi(^ ui(si) + ";^ xi(si); ^ u ijsi): (53)
Note that Pr(A(^ ui(s0
i))js0
i) > 0 implies Pr(A(^ ui(s0
i)jsi) > 0 by Assumption 3.(i). Therefore,
(52) leads to
0 < Pr(A(^ ui(s0
i)jsi)E[R
i (^ xi(s0
i);S)   ^ ui(s0
i)jA(^ ui(s0
i));si]: (54)
Because seller i can approximate his conditional interim payo arbitrarily well to the right
hand side of (54) by submitting a slightly higher payo bid that, with probability one, does
not tie the others' payo bids, along with submitting ^ xi(s0
i), (54) implies that the inequality
on the rst line of (53) holds. The inequality on the second line follows the denition of
supui;xi Vi(ui;xi;^ u ijsi) and the equality on the third line holds because the fourth inequality
in (50) is in fact an equality. (53) shows that 0 < lim"#0 Vi(^ ui(si) + ";^ xi(si); ^ u ijsi). Because
Pr(A(^ ui(si)jsi) > 0; it implies that
E[R
i (^ xi(si);S)   ^ ui(si)jA(^ ui(si));si] > 0:
Therefore, the inequality in (51) must be strict for a.e. si such that Pr(A(^ ui(si)) jsi) > 0 so
that E[i(S)jA(^ ui(si));si] = 1 for a.e. si such that Pr(A(^ ui(si))jsi) > 0:
Let TI = fs : ^ ui(si) = maxj ^ uj(sj) > u;8i 2 Ig for any non-empty subset I 
f1;:::;Ng. Consequently, if Pr(TI) > 0; then every i 2 I; i(s) = 1 for a.e. s 2 TI: However, P
i2I i(s)  1 for a.e. s 2 [0;1]N: This implies that #(I) = 1: Therefore, the probability
that under payo bidding functions ^ u, two or more sellers simultaneously submit the highest
bid above u is zero. Then, for every i and a.e. si; Vi(^ ui(si);^ xi(si); ^ u ijsi) is continuous at




 ijsi) = Vi(^ ui(si);^ xi(si);; ^ u ijsi) for a.e. si and (49) implies
that f(^ u1;^ x1);:::;(^ uN;^ xN)g is a monotone equilibrium of the modied procurement.
Proof of Theorem 2. Fix a monotone equilibrium f(^ u1;^ x1);:::;(^ uN;^ xN)g in the modied
procurement for any given  = [1;:::;N] 2 [0;1]N: For any menu mi in the non-committed
procurement, let ~ ui(mi) be the maximum payo level that the buyer can achieve by choosing
mi: Let each seller i choose a menu m
i (si) that satises (i) ~ ui(m
i (si)) = ^ ui(si) for all si 2 [0;1];
(ii) (x
i(s);u(x
i(s)) ^ ui(si)) 2 D(mi) for all s 2 [0;1]N; (iii) (^ xi(si);u(^ xi(si)) ^ ui(si)) 2 D(mi)
for all si 2 [0;1]; and (iv) m
i (si) 6= m
i (s0
i) if si 6= s0
i: Once the buyer accepts seller i's menu mi;
given the other sellers' menu strategies m
 i; she chooses a contract from mi in the following
manner:
1. If mi = m





(^ xi(si);u(^ xi(si))   ^ ui(si)) 2 D(mi) with prob 1   i
(x
i(s);u(x




 i(s i)) = (xi;u(xi)   ~ ui(mi)) with prob. one, where x is some
arbitrary characteristics such that (xi;u(xi)   ~ ui(mi)) 2 D(mi).
Because D(mi) is the set of optimal contracts for the buyer once she accepts mi;  =
[
1;:::;
N] characterized by 1 and 2 is a continuation equilibrium. Suppose that seller i
chooses a strategy m
i : When his signal is si and he oers the menu m






(1   i)Pr(A(^ ui(si))jsi)E[(Ri(^ xi(Si);S)   ^ ui(Si))i(^ u(S))jA(^ ui(si));si]+
i Pr(A(^ ui(si))jsi)E[(Ri(x
i(S);S)   ^ ui(Si))i(^ u(S))jA(^ ui(si));si] =
Vi(^ ui(si);^ xi(si); ^ u ijsi): (55)
There are two types of deviations in the non-committed procurement. First of all, consider
that seller i deviates to a menu m
i (s0
i) for some s0
i (s0
i 6= si). When seller i with si deviates to
the menu m
i (s0
i), the buyer believes that his signal is s0
i: Once she accepts the menu m
i (s0
i);
she will take the characteristics ^ xi(s0
i) with probability 1 i and the characteristics x
i(s0
i;s i)
with probability i when the other sellers' menus are m










i ) = (1   i)Pr(A(^ ui(s0
i))jsi)
E[(Ri(^ xi(s0
i);S)   ^ ui(s0
i))i(^ ui(s0






i;S i);S)   ^ ui(s0
i))i(^ ui(s0
i); ^ u i(S i))jA(^ ui(s0
i));si]: (56)













i);si;^ u i);S)   ^ ui(s0
i))i(^ ui(s0





i(S);S)   ^ ui(s0
i))i(^ ui(s0





i);si;^ u i); ^ u ijsi): (57)
We show why (57) holds. Note that the equality in (57) follows the denition of the
interim payo for seller i with si; i.e., Vi(^ ui(s0
i);xe
i(^ ui(s0
i);si;^ u i); ^ u ijsi); in the modied
procurement when he deviates to submit the bid (^ ui(s0
i);xe
i(^ ui(s0
i);si;^ u i)): Consider the in-
equality in (57). The winning event associated with the bid (^ ui(s0
i);xe
i(^ ui(s0
i);si;^ u i)) in the
modied procurement and the winning event associated with m
i (s0
i) in the non-committed
procurement are both A(^ ui(s0
i)): When seller i of signal si deviates to m
i (s0
i) in the non-
committed procurement, the buyer chooses (^ xi(s0
i);u(^ xi(s0
i))   ^ ui(s0





i;s i))   ^ ui(s0
i)) at each s i with probability i as if seller i's signal
was s0
i: However, when seller i of signal si deviates to the bid (^ ui(s0
i);xe
i(^ ui(s0
i);si;^ u i)) in the





i);si;^ u i))   ^ ui(s0
i))
with probability 1   i and a correct jointly ex-post ecient contract
(x
i(si;s i);u(x
i(si;s i)   ^ ui(s0
i))
38at each s i with probability i, knowing that seller i's true signal is si. Therefore, the inequality
in (57) holds.





i);si;^ u i); ^ u ijsi)  Vi(^ ui(si);^ xi(si); ^ u ijsi) (58)




i )  Vi(^ ui(s0
i);xe
i(^ ui(s0













Therefore, it is not protable for seller i with a.e. si to deviate to m
i (s0
i) with s0
i 6= si in the
non-committed procurement.




i 2 [0;1]: In continuation equilibrium ; the buyer takes characteristics xi along with
the monetary payment u(xi)   ~ ui(mi) with probability one upon accepting mi: Suppose that
seller i deviates to submit (~ ui(mi);xi) in the modied procurement. The winning event for
seller i in the modied procurement is the same as the one in the non-committed procurement.
While the buyer always chooses (xi;u(xi)   ~ ui(mi)) in the non-committed procurement upon
accepting mi, she chooses (x
i(s);u(x
i(s)) ~ ui(mi)) with probability i and (xi;u(xi) ~ ui(mi))
with probability 1   i in the modied auction. Because x
i(s) is jointly ex-post ecient,
seller i's interim payo upon deviation to a menu mi in the non-committed procurement is no




i )  Vi(~ ui(mi);xi;^ u ijsi): (59)
Because f(^ u1;^ x1);:::;(^ uN;^ xN)g is a monotone equilibrium in the modied procurement, we
have
Vi(~ ui(mi);xi;^ u ijsi)  Vi(^ ui(si);^ xi(si); ^ u ijsi): (60)
for a.e. si: From (55), (59) and (60), we can conclude, for a.e., si;
Vi(mi;m
 ijsi;









Because there is no protable deviation for each seller i in the non-committed procurement,
the existence of the truthful monotone equilibrium fm
1;:::;m
N; g follows immediately
from the existence of the corresponding monotone equilibrium f(^ u1;^ x1);:::;(^ uN;^ xN)g in the
modied procurement.
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